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EDUCATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RECOGNITION OF
MARRIAGE
Scott FitzGibbon*

I. INTRODUCTION

This article describes a fundamental dimension, ignored in
the literature, of the ethical basis of the fiduciary relationship.
It considers and rejects an account of the fiduciary relationship
based on contract. It develops, instead, a virtue-based approach
to the fiduciary relationship founded upon the goods of
faithfulness, beneficence, clarity of thought, and dedication to
the truth.
This article proposes that the relationship between teacher
and student is fiduciary. It develops the thesis that a primary
or secondary school teacher has especially high duties to the
student: obligations, resembling those of a guardian, a trustee,
an executor, and an attorney, offidelity, zealous devotion to the
well-being of the other party, and full disclosure. This article
does not endorse this approach for the positive law. It is not
here proposed that teachers be held legally liable for violations
of those obligations. The topic of this article, rather, is ethics.
The teacher, it is here proposed, is morally a fiduciary.
Teachers in primary and secondary schools are ethically
fiduciaries in a special way because they exercise, exemplify,
and transmit fiduciary virtues and, preeminently, the
intellectual virtues.
This Article sketches a few implications of virtue-based
fiduciary ethics and proposes some implications for teachers
pertinent to the recognition of marriage.

* Scott FitzGibbon-J.D., Harvard; B.C.L., Oxford-is a Professor at the Boston
College Law School. He is a member of the Massachusetts bar. Copyright 2011 by Scott
FitzGibbon.
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THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY

A.

Legal Doctrines and Principles

A fiduciary is a trustee for the beneficiaries, 1 a guardian for
the ward,2 an attorney for a client, 3 an executor for the heirs, 4 a
corporate director (or officer) for the corporation or its
shareholders, 5 and an agent for the principal. 6 According to
some authorities, a physician or a psychiatrist may be a
fiduciary for a patient, 7 and a partner may be a fiduciary for a
partner.R

1. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT E'l' AL., Bom:tn's TRUSTS AND TRUSTEI•:S § 1 (:3d
ed. 2010) ("A trust may be defined as a fiduciary relationship in which one person holds
a property interest, subject to an equitable obligation to keep or usc that interest for
the benefit of another."); RgSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 2 (1959) ("A trust ... is a
fiduciary relationship with respect to the property, subjecting the person by whom the
title to the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit
of another person .... "). See generally John H. Langbein, Questioninf.{ the Trust Law
Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 111 YALE L.,J. 929 (2005).
2. See In re Estate of Swiecicki, 477 N.E.2d 488, 490 (Ill. 1985); Michael D.
Casasanto et al., A Model Code of Ethics for Guardians, 11 WHITTIER L. Rr:v. 543, 550
(1989) ("[Tjhe guardian is required to exercise the highest desrree of trust, loyalty and
fidelity in making decisions on behalf of the ward."); id at 555 ("The relationship
between a guardian and ward is fiduciary in nature."); Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of
Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, DUKE
LAW SCHOOL FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, Paper 4 7, 11 (Aug. 1, 2006), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 104 7 &contcxt=duke_fs;
La wrcnce
Frolik, Is a Guardian the Alter Ego of the Ward'l, 37 STETSON L. REV. 53, 51 (2007)
(stating that the guardian has a fiduciary duty "of care and loyalty to the ward").
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW Gov":RNINn LAWYERS§ 16 cmt. b (2000)
("A lawyer is a fiduciary.").
4. See John H. Langbein, Questioninf.{ the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole
Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 931 n.15 (2005).
5. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)
(presenting a thorough exposition of several aspects of the director's and officer's
fiduciary duty).
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) ("Agency is the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a 'principal') manifests to another person (an
'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act."). See Burdett
v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1::375, 1:381 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing an agent's fiduciary duty to
"treat the principal as well as the agent would treat himself''); Dc>l>orah A. DeMott,
Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049 (20(l7).
7. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A Physician's Fiduciary
Duty to Disclose Medical Risk to the Patient, 86 WASH. U. L. HEV. 1167 (2009).
8. The Uniform Partnership Act (1997) provides that "[tjhe only fiduciary duties
a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and
the duty of care .... "The Comment states:
Arguably, the term 'fiduciary' is inappropriate when used to describe the duties of
a partner because a partner may legitimately pursue self-interest . . and not
solely the interest of the partnership and the other partners, as must a true
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A fiduciary must display "a true faithfulness and devotion"
to the beneficiary, 9 treating him "as well as [he] would treat
himsel£." 10 He must, in many circumstances, follow the
beneficiary's instructions, and not only those communicated
when the relationship was formed but also those given during
the course of the relationship. He must consider the implicit as
well as the express instructions of the beneficiary, "so as to
infer, in a reasonable manner, what the [beneficiary] would
wish the [fiduciary] to do in light of the facts of which the
[fiduciary] has notice at the time of acting." 11
As this implies, the fiduciary must attend closely to the
beneficiary's purposes. A recent article proposes that a
fiduciary "must appropriate the objectives, goals, or ends of
another and then act on the basis of what the fiduciary believes
will accomplish them-a happy marriage of the [beneficiary's]
ends and the fiduciary's expertise." 12
The fiduciary has an especially high duty of disclosure.
More is required than that he avoid fraud and false statements:
he must be candid, and offer additional information beyond
what is specifically requested. 13 He must also respect
beneficiary confidences.

trustee. Nevertheless, partners have long been characteriwd as fiduciaries ....
Indeed, the law of partnership reflects the broader law of principal and agent,
under which every agent is a fiduciary.
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT§ 101 cmt. 1 (1997).
9. In re Walt Disney, 906 A2d at 67 (quoting with approval the statement in one
of the opinions of the trial court in the case that "[tjhe good faith required of a
corporate fiduciary includes ... a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders").
10. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) ("A
fiduciary duty is the duty of an agent to treat his principal with the utmost candor,
rectitude, care, loyalty, and good faith-in fact to treat the principal as well as the
agent would treat himself.") (citations omitted).
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 2.02 cmt. g (2006).
12. Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obli&ation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF.
L. REV. 99, 135 (2008).
n See Libby v. L.J. Corp., 217 F.2d 78, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Burger, J.) ("The
duty imposed [upon joint adventurers] is essentially one of good faith, fair and open
dealing and the utmost of candor and disclosure to all concerned."); Casasanto et a!.,
supra note 2, at 557 ("'nherent in the guardian's obligation to exhibit the highest
degree of trust, loyalty and fidelity in relation to the ward is the requirement that the
guardian share pertinent information with the ward about his or her condition and
financial status as well as any decisions the guardian is contemplating or may have
actually made. To the extent the ward is able to participate, there exists an affirmative
duty on the part of the guardian to share relevant information with the ward and thus
aim toward the goal of joint decision making.").
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A fiduciary's duties must not be diluted by self-interest. The
New York Court of Appeals has stated: "it is elemental that a
fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to
those whose interests the fiduciary is to protect . . . . [A]
fiduciary ... is bound to single-mindedly pursue the interests
of those to whom a duty of loyalty is owed .... " 14 Justice
Cardozo's opinion in Meinhard u. Salmon states:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while
the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is
unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been
the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine
the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of
particular exceptions .... Only thus has the level of conduct
for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden
by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any
judgment of this court . . . . Salmon had put himself in a
position in which thought of self was to be renounced,
however hard the abnegation. 15

B. Legal Theories 16
Leading scholars explain fiduciary duty as penumbral to a
contract. 17 They explain it as a device for making contract law
work under difficult circumstances: under conditions, that is,
where normal contract doctrines may not achieve their

14. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 571, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted).
15. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 515, 516, 518 (N.Y. 1928). See Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1 9:39); Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp.,
673 P.2d 660, 675-76 (Cal. 198:~).
16. See generally Deborah DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On ,Justifiable
Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 18 ARI%. L. ~lEV. 925, 9:34 n.-16 (2006)
(compiling references to many of the classic accounts of fiduciary duties); Langbein,
supra note 1; Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 (2009).
17. Similar approaches, not discussed here, understand fiduciary duty as
penumbral to tort or property law. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource
Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1:l99, 1403 (2002) ("What distinguishes a
fiduciary from many other contracting parties . . . is that a fiduciary exercises
discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary .... ").
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purposes. 1 ~ Guardian-ward relationships afford an example.
The guardian may breach his promises but avoid contract
liability because the ward is a

child and therefore unable

supervise, detect breaches, complain, or seek relief. 19 Attorneyclient relationships supply another example. An attorney may
fail to perform as promised but avoid liability because the
client lacks the expertise to detect poor lawyering. 20 According
to this analysis, the law imposes fiduciary duties in order to
strengthen contract rights. By forbidding conflicts of interest,
the law diminishes the fiduciary's temptation to violate his
promises. By requiring fulsome disclosure, the law facilitates
detection

of misconduct.

By

affording

unusually

generous

remedies, the law deters wrongdoing in an especially strong
way.2I

18. Sec Larry E. llibstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209
(2005) passim and especially at 218 n.38 (discussing how "fiduciary duties are a
standard tl,rm that the law provides in order to minimize the parties' contracting
cost").
19. Burdett u. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The common law
imposes [a fiduciary] duty when the disparity between the parties in knowledge or
power relevant to the performance of an undertaking is so vast that it is a reasonable
inference that had the parties in advance negotiated expressly over the issue they
would have agreed that the agent owed the principal the high duty that we have
described, because otherwise the principal would be placing himself at the agent's
mercy. An example is the relation between a guardian and his minor ward, or a lawyer
and his client. The ward, the client, is in no position to supervise or control the actions
of his principal on his behalf; he must take those actions on trust; the fiduciary
principle is designed to prevent that trust from being misplaced."); Pohl v. National
Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The reason for the duty
is clearest when the agent has a broad discretion the exercise of which the principal
cannot feasibly supervise, so that the principal is at the agent's mercy. The agent
might be the lawyer, and the principal his client; or the agent might be an investment
adviser, and the principal an orphaned child. If the agent has no discretion and the
principal has a normal capacity for self-protection, ordinary contract principles should
generally suffice.").
20. RF:STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THB; LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 16, cmt. b (2000)
("A lawyer is a fiduciary, that is, a person to whom another person's affairs are
entrusted in circumstances that often make it difficult or undesirable for that other
person to supervise closely the performance of the fiduciary. Assurances of the lawyer's
competence, diligence, and loyalty arc therefore vital. Lawyers often deal with matters
most confidential and vital to the client. A lawyer's work is sometimes complex and
technical, often is performed in the client's absence, and often cannot properly he
evaluated simply by observing the results. Special safeguards are therefore
necessary."). Another circumstance which may impede the functioning of contract
doctrine is the conferral of broad discretion by one party upon another. This is
emphasized as a rationale for the recognition of fiduciary duties in Tamar Frankel,
Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983).
21. See f?Cnerally DeMott, supra note 6, at 1056-57 (2007) ("The remedies
available to a principal do not map neatly onto the contours of either contract law or
tort law principles and remedies. For example, remedies that have the consequence of
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This account understands fiduciary duties to be
instrumental goods. It explains them as means for achieving
the performance of contract and implies that the moral bases of
the fiduciary relationship are similar to the moral bases of
contract. This understanding is criticized in the next section of
this Article.
The contract-instrumentalist approach implies that
whether a relationship is fiduciary or not ought to depend on
the presence or absence of circumstances which impede the
functioning of contract.

C. Teachers
Teachers are generally not subject to fiduciary duties as a
matter of law. 22 This might seem incongruous, as they are in a
position to violate contractual duties and to do harm through
bad teaching, and their violations are not readily susceptible to
remedy by those in their charge.
The law's omission to subject teachers to fiduciary duties
can be explained in part by institutional considerations. Most
teachers are civil servants, subject to supervision by school
administrators, school boards, and other elected officials.
Teachers are also, to some extent, subject to supervision by
parents. Perhaps these supplementary sources of direction and
control are sufficient to remedy the incapacity and lack of
experience of the students.

stripping profit or benefit from the agent do not necessarily approximate the amount of
harm that a principal either has suffered or would be able to prove or the benefit that
the principal expected to reali?:e through the transaction conducted by the agent. As a
consequence, fiduciary doctrine as a whole is often characteriwd as prophylactic,
geared to discourage breach by persons subject to fiduciary duties. Thus, a breach of a
duty of loyalty triggers remedies and other consequences, distinct from whether the
person protected by the duty can establish that the breach in fact led to injury or in
fact stemmed from disloyal motives on the part of the fiduciary. It's no defense to a
fiduciary who self-deals or otherwise breaches a duty of loyalty that the beneficiary of
the duty in some sense benefited through the fiduciary's conduct. Fiduciary doctrine's
stringency reflects pragmatic concerns. These include the difficulties inhcnmt in
judicial second-guessing of decisions that arc often discretionary, as well as the ease
with which a disloyal fiduciary may often conceal misconduct.").
22. See generally Kent Weeks & Rich Haglund, Fiduciary IJuties of College and
University Faculty and Administrators, 29 J.C. & U.L. 15:3 (2002). But cf Michael
Plaut, Boundary Issues in Teacher-Student Relationships, 19 .J. SEX & MAiiiTAL
THERAPY 210 (1993) (suggesting that a fiduciary relationship exists between college
teachers and their students).
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Doubtless other reasons can be adduced, 23 but a key insight
here is that these reasons are, in a broad sense, procedural.
They do not go to the moral core.

III.

THE BASIC ETHICS OF THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP

This section aims to discover basic dimensions of the ethics
underlying fiduciary relationships. It rejects contractinstrumentalism as insufficient and proposes a different basis.

A.

What We Are Looking For

The aim of this article is not to justify the law. Some
relationships which the law deems fiduciary may not stand on
the same ethical basis as do most others; and some
relationships which the law relegates to nonfiduciary
categories may be "ethically fiduciary." Perhaps, however, the
law will prove suggestive. So also may social practice and social
morality.

B.

The Insufficiency of Contract Instrumentalism 24

The contract-instrumentalist approach implies a chilly
approach to fiduciary commitments. Consider the limits:
First, contract instrumentalism implies that there would be
no fiduciary relationship where there was no contract. If
contract and contract ethics are founded mainly on the
morality of promise, as many assert, then they afford little
warrant for extension to instances where there has been no
promise. 25 Where there has been no clear offer or no

2a. For example: teachers provide a service which, unlike those of most
fiduciaries, takes effect only with the activo participation of the beneficiary; so that,
especially in the higher grades, any allegation of bad teaching might he rebutted hy
indicia of had studying.
21. See Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L.
REV. :30:l (1999).

25. Similarly, contract instrumentalism affords little or no basis for recognizing
fiduciary duties in instances in which the contract has been fully performed (little
basis, therefore, for establishing an attorney's duties to a former client for whom he has
performed all his promisl,s). See DeMott, supra note 6, at 1057-58 ("A possible
generalization is that duties of loyalty play an exclusively subsidiary function, which is
to assist in securing the performance of other duties. More specifically, duties of loyalty
perform an insulation role that attaches adverse legal consequences to conduct by an
agent or other fiduciary who undertakes a distracting interest or influence. Although
this generalization helps explain much about the consequences that follow breaches of
duties of loyalty, its explanatory force has limits. For example, it is not a defense to an
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acceptance, where the parties are not in privity, contract
instrumentalism supplies no firm basis for fiduciary doctrine.
Such circumstances are endemic to connections deemed
fiduciary both by law and social morality, and therefore we
may suspect that contract instrumentalism misses the mark.
Attorneys, for example, frequently form relationships with
clients through communications which are too generally
phrased to amount to contractual offers; trustees in large
organizations and directors in corporations are doubtfully in
privity with those whom they serve.
Second, contract instrumentalism implies that fiduciary
duties should be closely bound to the contract terms, leaving
little scope for obligations far removed from express
undertakings. It supplies little support for the fiduciary's
obligation zealously to serve the purposes of the beneficiary.
Third, contract instrumentalism implies that fiduciary
duties may be dispensed with when the good of contract can
more efficiently be served in other ways. If protection against
breach of contract can more efficiently be afforded by
institutional safeguards, for example, the fiduciary approach
ought to be eschewed. As indicated above, this may be the case
with teachers.
A final point notes the disparity between the social morality
of contract and the ethics which fiduciaries themselves often
embrace and which society endorses. Contract morality has a
chilly feel, incongruous with the self-extending, fulfilling,
generous quality of the fiduciary persona. Few lenders are
zealous to serve the borrower. Scrooge performed his contracts;
perhaps his virtues were sufficient to that end. His were the
"morals of the market place" and imposed no requirement for
the renunciation of "thought of self."

C.

A Virtue-Based Dimension

The true foundation for fiduciary ethics is the
noninstrumental good of the fiduciary virtues. It is a good thing
to be capable of loyalty, good to be honorable and trustworthy,

agent who breaches a duty of loyalty that the agent can establish that other duties
owed the principal were performed with good outcomes for the principal. That is, if
duties of loyalty have purely subsidiary functions, it's odd that the common law
consistently denies the agent an affirmative defense of establishing due performance of
the agent's duties of performance." (notes omitted)).
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good to be capable of service, good to be candid. It is good to be
clear-headed, insightful, and wise: the mind with its
excellences, Aristotle persuades us, is "the best thing in us." 26
To be sure, such character traits are often good because of what
they help to achieve-they may be helpful in securing wealth or
prestige, for example-but they are worth having and
exercising in themselves, quite apart from what other things
they may lead to. These propositions invoke Aristotelean
ethics. They are among the core doctrines of the virtue-based
ethical theory which was developed in classical antiquity,
which was embraced Thomas Aquinas and the Scholastics, and
which thence laid the foundations of English equity. Classical
virtue-based ethics thus guided the Chancellors who created
fiduciary principles.
Space and time do not present the opportunity for a
fundamental development of this ethic here. It must be
commended by an appeal to common sense. Who would choose
to be shifty, untrustworthy, selfish, muddle-headed, and
foolish, though he had all the other goods? Who would not seek
instead to be steady, faithful, loyal, reliable, clear-headed, and
wise (even in those unusual circumstances where no profit or
further advantage could be secured through the exercise of
those virtues)? Who would not seek, not only to possess, but
also to act on these excellences of character? Action brings to
fruition the deliberations and dispositions of the acting person.
Good action expresses and deploys the actor's understanding of
the good. 27 (This might be illustrated by the example of a
sculptor: it is good for him to have a sculptor's talent and
training, good to develop it through study and observation, but

26. See Aristotle, NICHOMACHgAN ETHICS 163 (Tl~rence Irwin trans., 2d ed.,
1999), which reads:
If happiness [cudaemonia: the final good for man] is activity in accord with virtue,
it is reasonable for it to accord with the supreme virtue, which will he the virtue of
the best thing. The best is understanding ... and to understand what is fine and
divine, hy being itself either divine or the most divine element in us. Hence
complete happiness will be its activity in accord with its proper virtue; and ... this
activity is the activity of study.
"Study" is a translation of a cognate of "theorein." Irwin explains: "In Aristotle's most
specialized use, theorein refers to the contemplative study that he identifies with
HAPPINESS, or with a part of it. This is study in the sense in which I 'study' a face or
a scene that I already have in full view .... " ld. at 349.
27. See John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor ~ 71.2 (Encyclical Letter of August 6,
199:3, 85 AAS 11 :J:J), in THE ENCYCLICALS CW JOHN PAUL II 674, 7::l2 (J. Michael Miller,
C.S.B., ed., Vatican Press trans., 1996) ("Human acts ... express and determine the
goodness or evil of the individual who performs them." (emphasis added)).
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good in yet a further way actually to practice his art. The
actions of a good person extend his goodness and, so to speak,
"realize" it and fulfill it. 2 S)
This virtue-based ethic provides a firm foundation for the
fiduciary requirements of loyalty and zeal. Self-sacrifice and
zealous service, even when they do not fulfill a promise,
exercise a set of important virtues. The virtue-based ethic
exhorts the fiduciary to look within himself, finding his guide
to action in his own nobler dispositions.

D.

What Constitutes an Ethically Fiduciary Relationship

The virtue-based ethic suggests elements which, when they
concur, establish a fiduciary relationship. The first element,
and the most obvious, is the presence of a potential beneficiary
and of an eligible bestower of fiduciary benefits. A fiduciary
relationship makes sense when circumstances present someone
(a "suitable beneficiary") who needs or would benefit by the
steady and consistent exercise of the loyalties of a steadfast
affiliate, and someone (a "qualified bestower of benefits") who
possesses the skills and attributes needed to exercise the
fiduciary virtues in ways which supply those needs and confer
benefits suited to the circumstances and projects of the
"suitable beneficiary."
The second element is a relationship between the suitable
beneficiary and the qualified bestower: an accord or accession
between them (not necessarily contractual) which deploys the
bestower to exercise zeal and loyalty and thereby to confer the
appropriate benefits, and which disposes the beneficiary to
receive them. A common project goes a long way towards
supplying this second element, especially when the project
requires, for its completion, a focused and sustained effort. Ad
libitem projects-that is, ones pursued without grave cause,
under transient conditions-seldom evoke the fiduciary
qualities. Perhaps the clerk of Oxenford in the Canterbury
Tales, 29 who "gladly would ... learn and gladly teach," was
under no special duty to the people he chanced to meet.

28. See Karol Wojtyla, The Person: Subject and Community, in I'EI{SON ANIJ
COMMUNITY: SELECTED ESSAYS 219, 235 (Theresa Sandok trans., 199:3) ("'n fulfilling
an action, I fulfill myself in it.").
29. GEOFPRJ<:Y CHAUCER, TH!C CANTEHBUHY TALES :30 (General Prologue, line :ilO)
(Peter Beidler trans., 2006).
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A third element, not requisite but in many ways helpful, is
that of social recognition. Fiduciaries are often holders of
"social offices," identified (as are lawyers, physicians and
teachers) as accredited bearers of expertise and exemplars of
commendable ways of life. Social norms about social offices
confer a special firmness and clarity of definition. Some
societies may project a culture of individualism and
competition into certain relationships-stockholder-stockholder
for example-which other cultures would imbue with a spirit of
trust. Fiduciary ethics appropriately respond to inherited
cultural understandings.

E.

Why It Matters

Of course under any reasonable ethic, the fiduciary aims at
the good of the beneficiary. How, then, has the virtue-based
ethic any distinctive implications?
Obviously, one major distinction looks to the type and range
of benefits, since as discussed above the contactinstrumentalist ethic is chilly and warrants little more than
that degree of beneficent action required by the terms of an
agreement. Virtue-based fiduciary ethics warrant more
generous principles of fiduciary service.
A second line of distinction concerns the fiduciary's selfunderstanding. The virtue-based ethic proposes an account
which the fiduciary can take to heart and weave into his
reflections upon himself. The fiduciary understands better and
participates more fully in the goods of beneficence and loyalty if
he understands that his role as fiduciary is based on those
virtues, and on an ethic which endorses them as
noninstrumental goods. 30 He is better off.

~lO. See generally Aristotle, Nicomachean I~thics Book VI, in II THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1807 (§ 1144a, lines 18-20) (,Jonathan Barnes ed., W. D.
Ross trans. (rev. by J.O. Urmson), 1981) ("[l]n order to be good one must be in a certain
state when one does the several acts, i.e. one must do them as a result of choice and for
the sake of the acts themselves."); id. at 1746 (§§ 1105a<lO to 1105b-1) ("[t]he agent ...
must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have
knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and
thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character."). He should
deliberate carefully and understand the good of what he does, since choice involves
"consideration and deliberation." Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, in II THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF ARISTOTU; 1922, 1912 (§ 1226b-8) (Jonathan. Barnes ed., J. Solomon, trans.,
1984).
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A third point notes that the self-understanding of the
fiduciary, in certain sorts of relationship, is of special
importance to the beneficiary. This "reflexive" dimension will
be referred to in the next section of this Article.

IV. TEACHERS AS FIDUCIARIES OF A SPECIAL SORT:
KNOWLEDGE FIDUCIARIES; MODELING FIDUCIARIES

It should be clear from the elements proposed in Section III
D that, ethically, teachers are fiduciaries.

A.

Special Dimensions of the Teacher-Student Relationship

Three features of the teacher-student relationship add
special fiduciary dimensions.
First, unlike many other fiduciary associations, the
"matter" of the relationship-the "stuff' which is transferredis knowledge. (So basic to the structure of a relationship is this
aspect that it is appropriate to suggest a special subcategory:
"knowledge fiduciaries.") More fundamentally, the matter of
the teacher-student relationship is the craft and skill and set of
virtues which enable a person to apprehend, appreciate, and
use knowledge: to learn, to consider and reconsider, and in
general, throughout life, to recognize, interpret, understand,
and deepen understanding.(It is appropriate to suggest the
term "wisdom fiduciaries.") From our teachers we learn to
learn. We acquire the virtues needed to become, as to live a
worthwhile life we must indeed become, teachers of ourselves.
Second, a special sector of the knowledge and wisdom
conferred in the student-teacher relationship consists in the
understanding and practice of affiliation, human relations, and
the fiduciary attributes themselves. Many school systems
expressly aim to teach students about the civic order (in a
Massachusetts formulation: the nature, of "government,
politics, and civic life"). 31 They seek to prepare students for
effective integration into society. 32 Massachusetts licensure

:H.
SOCIAL

MASSACHUSF:'l'TS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, MASSACHUSETTS HISTORY AND
SCIENCE
CURRICULUM
FI{AMEWORK
86
(200:3),
available
at

http://www.doe.mass.edu/framcwork/hss/final/pdf (identifying the goals of a twelfthgrade elective).
32. See National Education Association, Code of 8thics of the r;ducation
Profession (1975), reprinted in KENNETH A. STRIKE & JONAS H. SOLTIS, THE ETHICS OF
TEACHING viii, ix (5th ed. 2009) ("The educator strives to help each student realize his
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standards require that a teacher "[h]elps all students to
understand American civic culture, its underlying ideals,
founding political principles and political institutions, and to
see themselves as members of a local, state, national, and
international civic community." 33 This suggests that loyalty
and beneficence are also the "matter" of the teacher-student
relationship. (We can posit another subcategory: "affiliational
fiduciary.")
The third feature looks not only to what is transferred from
teacher to student but to the medium of transfer. Teaching is
personal in a way that most fiduciary roles are not. Teaching
and the achievements of teaching possess a "personalist"
dimension. Teachers impart wisdom and the affiliation virtues
by modeling them to their students. Modeling is recognized by
psychologists as a foundation for moral development in
children, 34 and there seems to be no reason to deny its efficacy
among young adults as well. It is appropriate to identify
teachers as "modeling fiduciaries."

B.

Why It Matters

If, then, teachers are knowledge fiduciaries, wisdom
fiduciaries, affiliational fiduciaries, and modeling fiduciaries, it
follows that the wisdom and knowledge about affiliations are

or her potential as a worthy and effective member of society.").
:13. Regulations for Educator Licensure and Preparation Program Approval, 603
MASS. CODE REGS. § 7.08(d)(1) (2011), available at http://www.doe.mass.edu/lawsregsl
60:-JCMR7.html?section=08.
34. See Gareth B. Matthews, Concept Formation and Moral Development, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PI•:RSPECTIVES ON DEVB:LOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 175, 185 (James
Russell ed., 1987):
A young child is able to latch onto the moral kind, bravery, or lying, by grasping
central paradigms of that kind .... Moral development is ... something much
more complicated than simple concept displacement. It is: enlarging the stock of
paradigms ... ; developing better and better definitions of whatever it is that
thest> paradigms exemplify; appreciating better the relation between
straightforward instances of the kind and close relativtes; and learning to
adjudicate competing claims from different moral kinds ....
See generally A. Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective, 52 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 1 (2001); Lawrence J. Walker et a!., Parent and Peer Contexts for
Children:~ Moral Reasoning Development, 71 CHILD DEVELOPM":NT 1033, 10:13 (2000)
("Psychoanalytic theory emphasizes early parent/child relationships in the
development of conscience through the mechanism of identification and consequent
internalization of values. Social-learning theory ... emphasizes the power of models
and so has also focused on parents' role in displaying and reinforcing appropriate
behaviors. Cognitive development theory . . . holds that interactions with peers are
more potent .... ").
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central to his office. It follows that the modeling of good
relationships is a vital part of his vocation. Excellence in
teaching entails possession of the social virtues-justice,
fidelity, beneficence, and sensitive perceptivity in human
relationships.
It further follows that excellence in teaching involves the
exercise of the social virtues. Solidarity with his colleagues,
excellence in his relationships with students, and a respectful
recognition of the relationships which his students have with
their families, are all crucial elements in the fiduciary
excellence of the teacher. It follows that central to his mission
as a teacher are his understanding of the elements of marriage
and his presentation, in word and in deed, of the fundamental
elements which make marriage what it is.

V. WORRISOME PATHOLOGIES
Fiduciary recogmtwn m1scarnes, as does affiliational
modeling,
when
a
teacher embraces
the
contractinstrumentalist understanding of his professional role,
presenting to his students a chilly, "I just do what I've
promised and I do it for the money," attitude. He fails to fulfill
himself as he might as a teacher, and he deprives his students
of an appropriate fiduciary model. He invites them to a
teacher-student relationship which likely implies a similarly
self-involved attitude and a similar minimalism of
commitment. 35
A teacher, as a fiduciary whose ethic is founded on the
modeling of affiliational knowledge, violates his trust in a
fundamental way when he ignores, deplores or misunderstands
the committed affiliational modalities of his students' lives and

:~5. See generally Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Bishops Gathered for the
61st General Assembly of the Italian Episcopal Conference: Take Upon Yourselves
Without Hesitation the Commitment to l~ducate (May '27, 2010), reprinted in
L'OSSERVATORE HOMANO, June '2, 2010, at 1, 3 (English edition) ("One essential root [of
a contemporary "emergency" in education] I think consists in a false concept of man's
autonomy: man should develop on his own, without interference from others, who could
assist his self-development but should not enter into this development. In reality, the
essential fact is that the human person becomes himself only with the other. The "I"
become itself only from the "thou" and from the "you". It is created for dialogue, for
synchronic and diachronic communion. It is only the encounter with the "you" and with
the "we" that the "["opens to itself. Thus, the so-called antiauthoritarian education is
not education hut the rejection of education; thus what we are bound to impart to
others is not imparted, meaning this "you" and "we" in which the "I" opens to itself.").
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of the social order to which they belong. 36
Fiduciary recognition would miscarry if it portrayed other
relationships of service in ways which distorted or occluded the
fiduciary-like elements. Teachers would damage their own
fiduciary mission if they ignored or deplored the duty-bearing,
fiduciary-like aspect of the parent-child relationship. Teachers
might, for example be misled by some contemporary socialscience writing which proposes that parents act mainly out of a
"need for belongingness" 37 or a "dyadic intention toward a ...
dependent growing out of a feeling toward that dependent," 38
maintaining that "[w]hat the parent does is to feel ....
[C]ognitions are not what motives a parent's actions-emotions
are .... ,39
Fiduciary recognition would miscarry if it adopted a
similarly emotionalist understanding of marriage. So might a
teacher do who adopted the view of one fairly prominent
scholar, who writes: "marriage today is a home for the heart:
entering, furnishing, and exiting that home is your business
alone. Today's marriage-from whatever angle you look-is
justified by the happiness of the pair."4 Fiduciary recognition
by a teacher would miscarry if the teacher adopted a contractinstrumentalist account of the relationship between married
couples, equating husbands and wives to the cohabitors whose
attitudes are described in a fairly recent study: 41

°

36. See National Education Association, supra note 32, at ix ("[T]he educator ...
[sjhall not deliberately suppress or distort subject matter relevant to the student's
progress.").
37. See Catrin Finkenauer & Wim Meeus, How (Pro-)Social Is the Caring Motive?,
11 l'SYCHOL. INQUJI{Y 100, 101 (2000) (An "important motive for caregiving may be
found in the human need for helongingness .... People ... go to great lengths to feel
they belong and to avoid feeling lonely."). For references to authorities which account
for attachments based on needs, see David C. Bell & Alan J. Richard, Caregiuing: The
Forgotten Element in Attachment, 11 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 69, 76 (2000).
:58. Bell & Richard, supra note 37, at 79. See generally David C. Bell & Alan .J.
Richard, Authors' Response: The Search for a Caregiving Motivation, 11 PSYCHOL.
INQUIRY 121 (2000).
39. Bell & Richard, supra note :!7, at 75 ("['l'Jhe parent looks into the child's eyes.
What the parent does is to feel .... [Tjhis is not a thinking moment. It is a feeling
moment. This moment and all the lifetime of moments following when l love her and
try to understand her and try to meet her needs with my limited resources are feeling
moments. Cognitions will he important in all these moments .... But these cognitions
are not what motivate the parent's actions-emotions are .... ").
40. E. J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FoR? THE STRANGE SOCIAL HISTORY OF OUR
MOST INTIMATE INSTITUTION 251 (20(H).
11. Joanna M. Reed, Not Crossing the "Extra Line':- How Cohabitors with
Children View Their Unions, 68 .J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 1117 (2006), available at
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I find that most cohabiting parents begin cohabiting in
response to a pregnancy but do not believe they should stay in
a relationship because of shared children. They view
cohabitation as a practical response to parenthood that allows
them to coparent and share expenses yet avoid the greater
expectations of commitment, relationship quality, and more
traditional and scripted family roles they associate with
marriage.

http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/1 O.lll.j.l 711-:ml7.2006.00:l18.x.

